South Caucasus Brief – November 2025

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Leading this month

And just like that, following a bout of specious bilateral tensions, Azerbaijan and Russia agreed to bury the hatchet. The rapprochement followed a birthday call and an Oct. 9 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the sidelines of the CIS Heads of State Council Meeting in Dushanbe. In an extraordinary move, Putin apologized for the downing of an Azerbaijani commercial airliner in December 2024, acknowledging that the crash was caused by a Russian anti-aircraft missile. The Russian president went to great lengths to downplay the episode, characterizing the recent tensions as a “crisis of emotions.”

Despite a frenzy of headlines predicting a rupture in relations, seasoned observers dismissed the notion of a sudden breakdown of the Baku-Moscow axis. Amid a decade-long realignment in the South Caucasus, Russia and Azerbaijan have fostered a robust strategic partnership — collaborating across various portfolios: disinformation, diplomacy and sanctions evasion. (Russia and Azerbaijan routinely stage tensions to mislead Western audiences. By feigning distance from Moscow, Baku maintains access to international markets and policy circles — while serving as a proxy for Russian interests.)

Though recent tensions appear largely choreographed, observers continue to ponder possible motivations behind the rift. A well-placed analyst suggests a genuine disagreement around energy exports. (Azerbaijan has long been considered a laundry for Russian oil.) Others speculate that the rupture served as a smokescreen to secure international buy-in for the “Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity” (TRIPP) — a U.S.-facilitated transportation corridor. (Contrary to popular narratives, the scheme enjoys Russian support.)

The vaguely defined TRIPP initiative closely mirrors the Baku-backed “Zangezur Corridor,” a proposed extraterritorial corridor linking Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia’s southern Syunik region. While advocates tout TRIPP as an economic lifeline — and a key cog in the emerging “Middle Corridor” connecting Europe and China — many experts argue its commercial potential is overstated. (Despite years of effort, neighboring Georgia has yet to reap significant dividends from its stretch of the Middle Corridor.) Instead, the corridor is poised to function as a de-facto, Baku-managed roadway connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey — advancing a long-standing Azeri geopolitical ambition.

What we are watching

Influence networks. The Baku–Moscow relationship, which has deepened since the early-2010s, is often described by the maxim “one elite, two states.” This partnership is anchored in a common worldview, shared regional interests and intertwined kleptocratic and financial networks. State-linked, Azeri-origin business figures play a key role in sustaining Baku’s lobbying infrastructure in Moscow. (According to the Russian daily Kommersant, Azerbaijani business networks operating in Russia command economic interests valued at approximately $50 billion.)

Over the last two decades, Baku has cultivated a symbiotic relationship with a prominent circle of Azeri-origin, Russia-based businessmen — God Nisanov, Vagit Alekperov, Farhad Akhmedov and Araz Agalarov. These partnerships provide oligarchs with economic benefits and political access, while expanding Baku’s clout across Russian power circles. And today, these oligarchs are ascending new heights.

Agalarov — whose son was formerly married to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s eldest daughter — wields considerable influence across the Kremlin. (He previously served as a key intermediary between Moscow and the 2016 Trump campaign.) Prominent property developer God Nisanov’s stock is also on the rise. Nisanov’s Kievskaya Ploschad Group, Russia’s largest commercial real estate holding, recently “secured” lucrative industrial assets from the Concord Group, the now-defunct company of slain Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin. He also maintains intimate ties to the siloviki (members of Russia’s security services), including the Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin. (According to Proekt, a Russian investigative outlet, Nisanov helped lobby Moscow not to intervene in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.)

Amid the rising fortunes of Azerbaijan’s clique of oligarchs, the economic and political influence of Armenian-origin oligarchs is rapidly waning. This diminished influence is partly the result of extensive Azerbaijani lobbying efforts. In recent years, several Armenian business figures have fallen out of favor with the Kremlin (i.e., Ruben Vardanyan and Levon Hairapetian.) The latter, a prominent philanthropist, died under suspicious circumstances in Russian prison.) Most recently, Samvel Karapetian appears to be on the chopping block. The Russian-Armenian billionaire was arrested in June by the Pashinyan administration on thinly evidenced “government overthrow” charges, following his public statements in support of the Armenian Apostolic Church. (The Kremlin’s response has been uncharacteristically tepid.)

Ecclesiastical row. On October 15, Armenian authorities arrested scores of clergy in the Aragatsotn region. And earlier in the month, Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, the head of the Shirak Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, was sentenced to two years on spurious charges of “calling for regime change.” The swift verdict — widely condemned by civil society — comes amid a months-long campaign against the Armenian Church and opposition elements, including recently detained Gyumri Mayor Vardan Ghukasyan.

Since early spring, the Pashinyan administration and the Armenian Church, led by Catholicos Karekin II, have been locked in a rancorous row. Armenia’s prime minister has launched broadsides and obscenities against the religious establishment. Other political figures have joined the fray, including Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan. (Hakobyan is largely considered a gray cardinal and manages media and financial networks for the ruling party.) On several occasions, Pashinyan has also floated removing the Catholicos — violating church bylaws and Armenia’s constitution.

While Yerevan–Etchmiadzin tensions long predate this episode, the latest escalation appears to be part of a coordinated campaign against the Armenian Church — with Azerbaijani and Russian involvement. Yerevan’s backlash appears to have been triggered by Catholicos Karekin II’s participation in an Artsakh focused World Council of Churches (WCC) forum in Bern. Yet the delegitimization drive launched by Armenian authorities mirrors narratives emerging from Baku — both in form and spirit. In a recent letter to the WCC, Azerbaijan’s top Shia Muslim cleric, Allahshukur Pashazade, blasted “the provocative, revanchist propaganda of the Armenian Church.” (And both Baku and Yerevan have cast Etchmiadzin as an opponent of regional “peace.” )

The campaign against Etchmiadzin is unfolding against the backdrop of Azerbaijani efforts to float the so-called Caucasian Albanian Church — widely viewed by observers as part of a state-backed historical-revisionist project. As part of this campaign, Baku has laid claim to Armenian heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh — and even to Saint Bartholomew, the patron saint of the Armenian Apostolic Church. And according to a well-placed ISA source, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is involved in legitimatizing the Caucasian Albanian Church. Scattered reports also indicate that Azerbaijan has transferred two church properties in Nagorno-Karabakh, among them the parcel of Shushi’s Kanach Zham Church, to the ROC. (The Baku Diocese of the ROC previously disputed Kanach Zham’s Armenian origins.)

(In recent years, the ROC and Vatican have benefited from Baku’s largesse. And in May, Patriarch Kirill, the ROC’s longtime head, awarded Azerbaijani First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva with the prestigious Order of St. Princess Olga for promoting “interfaith dialogue.”)

Sovereignty curtailed. Over the last year, amid a period of bilateral tensions, Moscow has expanded efforts to reshape Abkhazia’s political scene — including a crackdown on pro-sovereignty circles. Following the election of Abkhaz President Badra Gunba, a Russian favorite, and the appointment of Sergey Kiriyenko, a top Kremlin official, to oversee its Abkhazia portfolio, Moscow appears to be pressing ahead with plans to cement its grip over Sukhumi’s political class. (Moscow, working with local stakeholders, has a long track record of dismantling and molding national elites across its near abroad — most recently in Armenia and South Ossetia.)

Since January, Russia has targeted several members of Abkhazia’s pro-sovereignty camp. Abkhaz MP Kan Kvarchiya and opposition politician Levan Mikaa were stripped of their Russian citizenship — a lifeline for international travel. Russia’s Justice Ministry labeled journalist Inal Khashig a “foreign agent.” And Adgur Ardzinba, leader of the Abkhaz People’s Movement and a 2025 presidential contender, was detained for 15 days on traffic-violation charges in Sochi — widely viewed as a not-so-subtle political warning. Russian authorities have also restricted members of the Abkhaz diaspora — most notably those from Turkey — from entering the statelet. (The Turkish government also prevented the establishment of a polling station in the northwestern city of Adapazarı during Abkhazia’s latest presidential election.)

Amid public backlash, Abkhazia’s parliament recently agreed to establish a special commission to investigate the circumstances around Russia’s personal sanctions against Abkhaz citizens. However, amid widespread trepidation about criticizing Moscow, the commission’s prospects appear limited.

Deals and visits ✈️

What we are reading

  • Russian timber exports flow to Europe via Georgia and Kazakhstan (VSquare)
  • The secret corporate empire that captured Transnistria (Financial Times)
  • U.K. targets Azeri figures as part of Russian sanctions package (Open Sanctions)
  • Former Russian customs official found dead at Armenian consulate (Meduza)
  • Georgian Dream claims landslide victory in municipal elections (Insider)
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